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Why are some countries governed worse than others? In particular, why is contemporary 
Russia governed so much worse than one would expect given its degree of socio-economic 
development? As demonstrated in numerous recent assessments, Russia exhibits many 
major features of bad governance, including lack and/or perversion of the rule of law, 
rent-seeking, corruption, poor quality of state regulation, widespread abuse of public 
funds, and overall ineffectiveness of government. In 2018, for example, Russia ranked 
138th out of 180 countries in the annual Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index. In 2019, the composite evaluation of the Rule of Law Index by the 
World Justice Project ranked it as 88th out of 126 countries. According to the World Bank, 
the average indicator of corruption control in Russia in the period from 1996-2015 was 
-0.86 on a scale from -2.5 (lowest possible grade) tо +2.5 (highest possible grade).  
 
What are the sources and mechanisms of governance in Russia? Is bad governance 
doomed to persist endlessly under authoritarian rule, or can the quality of governance be 
improved over time by certain policies? Recent discussions attempting to explain good 
and bad governance in various countries, regions, and policy areas have been quite 
extensive. How can we place present-day Russia onto this global governance map? And 
should we consider Russia as an outlier or, rather, as a laggard vis-à-vis many other 
developed states? We argue here that the Russian political regime provides insufficient 
incentives for good governance, and that attempts to improve the quality of governance 
without democratization will not ultimately prove fruitful. 
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Sources of Good and Bad Governance 
 
Many scholars have sought to explain the sources of good governance and reasons for its 
failure. Although the conventional wisdom among experts is that authoritarian states are 
often governed poorly due to predatory political leaders who abuse their offices for the 
sake of political survival, there is a shortage of explanations for how effective and efficient 
governance can persist under non-democratic regimes. Meanwhile, the real practices of 
governance in post-communist Russia are more complex than one might expect judging 
by global indexes alone. Russia demonstrates several varieties of governance, including 
numerous instances of better-than-expected governance in various policy areas and 
geographical locations. Certain policy reforms conducted in the early 2000s had positive 
impacts on patterns of governance throughout the country. Many of these, including some 
“success stories,” have been sustained over the last decade. Yet many proposals to 
improve the quality of governance either failed completely or were implemented partially 
and inconsistently. 
 
At the macro-level of analysis, there are several major explanations for varieties of 
governance, ranging from the powerful institutionalist approach to the macro-level 
societal approach. These explanations tend to emphasize the role of social capital, social 
embeddedness, and personal networks—all of which impact levels of social trust—as 
major essential components of the quality of governance. Overall, however, there is a 
dismal consensus among specialists, who perceive bad governance in Russia as a long-
term pattern that emerged in the Soviet period (if not earlier) and continues to persist over 
time. At best, scholars express some hope for the long-term effects of economic growth, 
which may lay down favorable conditions for improving the quality of governance in 
Russia some decades (if not centuries) from now. 
 
Meanwhile, empirical analysis of changing patterns of governance in Russia after the 
Soviet collapse requires a more in-depth understanding of the mechanisms and drivers of 
changes in different policy fields. In times of institutional changes, the effects of political 
leadership and policy ideas are especially important. Nevertheless, some of the ideational 
approaches to patterns of governance in Russia tend to portray them as a Manichean 
struggle between technocratic policy reformers and rent-seekers, blaming the latter group 
of actors for the building of “kleptocracy,” “crony capitalism,” and “mafia states.” While 
the factual grounds for such criticism are often correct, normatively-driven explanations 
of this kind are insufficient. The same actors who endorse policies aimed at improvement 
of the quality of governance may also adopt measures with potentially devastating effects 
on governance—Vladimir Putin might be considered a prime example of this. 
 
Uncovering Mechanisms of Governance in Russia 
 
In theory, if rulers of any given country face little or no constraint, then bad governance 
will be the norm, and good governance will be the exception. If and when rulers’ time 
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horizons are short, they tend to behave as Mancur Olson’s “roving” rather than 
“stationary” bandits, governing their domain in a predatory way. In contrast, good 
governance does not emerge by default but is developed in response to major domestic 
and international challenges. Historically, these challenges emerged as effects of 
international rivalry and/or from domestic political pressure. Rulers need to improve the 
quality of governance in order to mitigate the risks of foreign conquest or domestic power 
loss through revolutions and civil wars. Nowadays, however, these risks are not as high 
as they were in the past, thus offering authoritarian rulers a larger degree of freedom in 
developing various mechanisms of governance. Still, not all modern autocracies 
necessarily result in comprehensive bad governance, although examples of authoritarian 
good governance are relatively rare. As summarized by one bitter statement: “for every 
President Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore there are many like President Mobutu Sese Seko 
of Zaire (now called the Democratic Republic of the Congo).” 
 
From this perspective, present-day Russia resembles neither Singapore nor Congo. 
Russia’s authorities pursue ambitious developmental goals in various policy areas and 
promote a number of state-directed programs and projects intended, inter alia, to improve 
the quality of governance. The results of these initiatives have been mixed. In our view, 
the contemporary Russian state has failed to produce sufficient positive incentives for 
good governance for several reasons.  
 
First and foremost, widespread suspicions of top-level officials about the behavior of their 
subordinates lead them to assume, almost by default, that without strict control, the lower 
layers of the “power vertical” have no incentives for improving their performance. As a 
result, legal frameworks, set up by countless laws, decrees, and instructions, have 
contributed to the phenomenon of the “over-regulated state,” which combines a very high 
density of poor-quality state regulations with the sweeping discretion of regulatory 
agencies and state watchdogs. Against a background of weak independent media, 
professional communities, and self-regulation mechanisms, and in the absence of electoral 
democracy, separation of power, and the rule of law, state regulations serve as substitutes 
for other mechanisms of accountability. These practices are not only very costly in terms 
of resources and agency costs, they also contribute to further aggravation of the principal-
agent problem. Mechanisms of “manual control” cannot work effectively, therefore the 
top layers of the “power vertical” are forced to rely upon a limited number of easily 
quantifiable indicators that serve as targets for subordinates. In turn, the lower layers of 
the “power vertical” consider these targets the major (if not the only) criteria for 
evaluating their performance, and pursue the achievement of these goals at any cost. 
 
The second reason for the failure of incentives for good governance lies in the electoral 
nature of Russia’s authoritarianism, which is heavily dependent upon the political rather 
than economic performance of the “power vertical.” The performance of regional and 
municipal authorities is judged by election results, not by socio-economic achievements. 
Furthermore, state enterprises and organizations perform functions of workplace 
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electoral mobilization for the sake of the Kremlin and its sub-national agents. The 
mechanism of accountability within the “power vertical,” based upon prioritization of 
such political indicators as ‘degree of popular trust in the president’ in a given region, is 
institutionalized. In other words, the delivery of votes can become a more important task 
for Russian local governments than the delivery of local public goods. Placing political 
loyalty above professional efficiency serves as the Achilles heel for a number of 
authoritarian regimes, and Russia is by no means an exception. 
 
Thirdly, the focus on building multiple regulatory barriers as “sticks” against the spread 
of bad governance coincides with a major shortage of “carrots,” or positive incentives for 
good governance. A heavy regulatory burden coupled with permanent risks of 
punishment for real or imagined legal violations, in the context of increasing repressions 
against elites, puts mid-range officials in an ambiguous position. Rank-and-file officials 
face limited incentives for policy entrepreneurship aimed at improving institutional 
performance and may prefer the preservation of the status quo as an instrument to avert 
these risks. The excessive use of “sticks” rather than “carrots” may close the path to 
improvement for institutional performance. Positive incentives (e.g. strong reputations, 
official rewards, opportunities for upward career mobility) may not be efficient enough 
for the promotion of good governance. The lack of competition between agents for better 
performance only increases the arbitrariness of evaluations within the “power vertical.” 
Thus, it is hard to expect systematic cultivation of long-term incentives for policy 
entrepreneurship and the promotion of good governance in Russia. 
 
This constellation of factors diminishes possibilities for the advancement of good 
governance. Is there any chance of improving existing practices of good governance under 
the current political regime, or, rather, is this mission impossible in the absence of major 
regime changes? 
 
Countering Bad Governance in Russia: Imperfect Recipes 
 
Russia’s top leaders are well aware of the country’s poor quality of governance and often 
raise this issue in their agendas. They have offered several recipes for improving the 
quality of governance, which may be summarized as a combination of three major 
directions, or 3D—deregulation, digitalization, and decentralization. However, these 
recipes, as well as their actual implementation, appear to be imperfect approaches to 
countering bad governance. 
 
Deregulation as an instrument for the improvement of quality of governance is vigorously 
advocated by liberal economists. The problem, however, is two-fold. Firstly, despite the 
loud rhetoric of state officials who have called for a “regulatory guillotine,” the outcomes 
of many revisions of numerous by-laws and governmental decrees are selective, partial, 
and insignificant as of yet. Entrenched bureaucrats and special interest groups have few 
incentives to revise the existing status quo. It is hard to expect that deregulation of Russian 
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education, public health, or academia will be effectively conducted by the same actors 
who previously contributed to their overregulation and imposed dubious practices of 
evaluation on them. Moreover, as deregulation remains a matter of the discretion of 
regulators themselves, such efforts may even result in some perverse effects such as 
“regulatory capture.” Secondly, deregulation can, at best, reduce the risks for policy 
entrepreneurship created by negative incentives within the “power vertical.” It cannot 
provide positive incentives for the improvement of the quality of governance per se, given 
the lack of any transparent meritocratic mechanism for rewards and career advancements 
within the state structure. 
 
Digitalization became a new catchword among Russian state officials and technocratic 
experts in the mid-2010s. The advancement of “algorithmic governance” is widely 
perceived as a mechanism for constraining the rent-seeking aspirations of special interest 
groups, as well as for the improvement of the effectiveness of government. Techno-
optimists even consider online platforms an instrument of accountability that may serve 
as a viable alternative both to the “power vertical” and to representative democracy. The 
evidence, however, does not fully support these optimistic expectations. Against a 
background of isolationist trends and the obsession of Russia’s leadership with threats to 
sovereignty, digitalization faces numerous political constraints, which have contributed 
to attempts to “nationalize” the Russian Internet. Furthermore, the government cannot 
resist special interest groups, which tend to adjust algorithmic governance to serve their 
own purposes. This approach is hardly compatible with the ideas of effectiveness and 
impartiality promoted by crusaders of digitalization. In the end, algorithms and online 
services can improve the quality of governance only if these mechanisms are 
complementary to impartial and effective offline governance, but not if they are aimed at 
substituting it. 
 
Lastly and importantly, decentralization remains the most problematic part of the current 
agenda, related to the consequences of the major political, economic, and administrative 
recentralization that Russia underwent in the 2000s. Following this turn, most of the 
country’s regions and localities became heavily dependent on the central government, 
and their autonomy was greatly reduced. This is why many projects and programs, aimed 
at the advancement of regional socio-economic development, are almost doomed to be 
very centralized. One temporary solution is the creation of specialized political and 
geographical areas that enjoy preferential treatment as well as a certain degree of 
decentralization and deregulation granted by the central authorities.  
 
Given the consequences of recentralization amid Russia’s sluggish economic growth in 
the 2010s, only a handful of Russia’s wealthier regions, being relatively independent from 
federal funding and driven by proactive leadership, can afford their own large-scale 
development programs and major innovation projects, such as the housing renovation 
program in Moscow. Most recently, the Russian government has actively promoted 
projects on participatory budgeting and other forms of public engagement across various 
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localities. While critical observers have dubbed these tendencies “participatory 
authoritarianism,” promoters of participatory budgeting in Russia argue that even small-
scale local funding has promoted grassroots enthusiasm and offered local activists new 
opportunities to improve their communities on the basis of joint responsibility shared 
between municipalities and local citizenry. These controversies may reflect a more 
fundamental issue of grassroots mass participation in the absence of democracy: public 
engagement promotes good governance only by being complementary to electoral 
accountability and separation of power at the local level, but not by being substitutive to 
them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The 4D solution, which goes beyond recipes of deregulation, digitalization, and 
decentralization and puts democratization as the number one item on the agenda of 
advancing good governance, remains beyond the current menu of Russia’s 
authoritarianism. This is why all other recipes for countering bad governance in the 
country may be considered at best partial and temporary solutions. Yet as the recent 
experience of Ukraine suggests, even the democratization of Russia’s political regime as 
such could not guarantee the diminishment of bad governance within the country. 
Nonetheless, without major political changes, there is no way to improve the quality of 
governance. Without these changes, Russia most likely will be doomed to muddling 
through numerous pathologies of bad governance while preserving certain “pockets of 
efficiency” in strategically-important priority sectors and policy fields, selectively picking 
up good apples fallen from the bad trees of ineffectiveness and un-rule of law. The 
question is to what extent these pathologies of bad governance could turn into chronic 
diseases, not curable under any treatment, and whether or not the “vicious circle” of bad 
governance in Russia may be broken in the foreseeable future. 
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